Agents frequently have different opinions on where to locate a public facility. While some agents consider the facility a good and prefer to have it nearby, others dislike it and would like to see it built far away from their own locations. To aggregate agents' preferences in these situations, we propose a new preference domain according to which each agent is allowed to have single-peaked or single-dipped preferences on the location of the facility, but in such a way that the peak or dip is situated in her own location. We characterize all strategy-proof rules in this general framework and show that they are also group strategy-proof. Finally, we characterize for some focal cases the rules that additionally satisfy Pareto efficiency.
Introduction
Governments frequently decide where to locate public facilities like schools, hospitals, prisons, nuclear plants, or industrial parks. In order to select a location for a particular facility, the public decision makers have to take into account not only technical constraints but also the preferences of the agents in the society. Since preferences are private information and agents have incentives to reveal them truthfully or not depending on how this information is incorporated in the selection process, the objective is to construct social choice rules that induce agents to reveal their true preferences (a property known as strategy-proofness). However, Gibbard [7] and Satterthwaite [10] have shown in their famous impossibility result that if there are at least three feasible locations, strategy-proofness combined with a range of more than two alternatives or Pareto efficiency leads to dictatorial rules when preferences are unrestricted.
Given this negative result, the literature has aimed at constructing meaningful strategy-proof rules in situations when the preference domain can be restricted naturally (see Barberà [1] for a survey). The most well-known preference restrictions for the location of public facilities are the single-peaked and the single-dipped preferences, which appear when the considered facility is, respectively, a public good or a public bad. Formally, an agent has single-peaked (single-dipped) preferences on the real line if she has a best (worst) point and the further one moves away from this point maintaining the direction, the worse (better) the locations get. Moulin [9] and Barberà and Jackson [4] have shown that all strategy-proof rules on the domain of single-peaked preferences are generalized median voter rules. Similarly, Manjunath [8] has established for the domain of single-dipped preferences that all strategy-proof and unanimous rules have to always select an extreme location (see also Barberà et al. [3] ).
However, the aforementioned frameworks cannot accommodate situations in which it is a priori unclear whether an agent considers a facility a good or a bad. 1 Therefore, a general model should include both single-peaked and single-dipped preferences as admissible preferences. Moreover, 1 Paradigmatic examples include, among many others, dog parks, industrial parks, and soccer stadiums.
agents typically have single-peaked or single-dipped preferences where the peak or dip is situated in their own locations (their homes, their municipalities, . . . ). Since the location of the agents is frequently known to the social planner (for example, regional governments are aware of the location of each municipality and local governments know the residence of each person), we propose the domain where the set of admissible preferences of an agent corresponds to all single-peaked preferences with the peak in her location and all single-dipped preferences with the dip in her location.
2
Our main result is a characterization of all strategy-proof rules on this preference domain. Thereby it will become clear that it is possible to escape from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibilities in many instances. In particular, we will see that all strategy-proof rules share the following common structure: (i) first, all agents are only asked about their type of preferences (single-peaked or single-dipped) and depending on the set of agents that have single-peaked preferences, at most two locations are preselected; (ii) if only one alternative is preselected, then this alternative is finally chosen; and (iii) if two alternatives are preselected, then all agents that are situated strictly between the two preselected alternatives have to indicate their ordinal preference over them (and, in case of indifference, their entire preferences) and, depending on the answers, it is decided which of the two preselected alternatives is finally chosen. The particular ways to pick the preselected locations that pass to the second phase and the form in which the final location is chosen have to satisfy some monotonicity conditions. These conditions are generally not too restrictive and leave space for the construction of Pareto efficient and strategy-proof rules when there are agents that are situated at feasible locations and/or to the left or right of all feasible locations. Additionally, we show that the strategy-proof rules are also group strategy-proof.
Our findings can improve the way in which the decisions of where to locate some facilities are taken.
2 Observe that the domain cannot be extended to include for each agent all single-peaked and all single-dipped preferences because this immediately leads to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibilities. To see why, observe that an agent with single-dipped preferences will manipulate any generalized median voter rule in some instance. See Berga and Serizawa [5] for additional results showing the difficulty of expanding the domain of single-peaked preferences without arriving at the impossibilities.
It complements the classical domains of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences in such a way that the decision of which is the best domain restriction and, as a consequence, which are the most appropriate rules to implement depends on the structure of the particular facility. To see this,
consider the following two alternative assumptions: (i) the facility is considered unanimously a good or a bad; or (ii) each agent can like or dislike the facility, but the peak/dip of her preferences is the point in which this agent is situated. If the second assumption is more (less) plausible, then this new framework is more (less) appropriate than the uniform single-peaked or single-dipped one.
3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the necessary notation, definitions and some examples that illustrate some of the insights of the results developed in the following sections. Section 3 introduces some conditions that define the main structure of the strategy-proof social choice rules. Section 4 provides a complete characterization of all strategyproof rules and shows that group strategy-proofness is obtained for free. Finally, we explain when this characterized family allows us to escape from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibilities and characterize for some focal cases the rules that additionally satisfy Pareto efficiency. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Notation, definitions, and examples
Consider a social planner that wants to locate a public facility in a point on a set T ⊆ R of feasible locations. There is a finite group of agents N , and each agent belonging to N is situated at a point on the real line. We denote the agent situated at i ∈ R by i ∈ N . 4 For the moment, we do not impose any restriction on N or T , or on the relation between these sets.
Let R i be the weak preference relation of agent i ∈ N on T . Formally, R i is a complete and transitive binary relation. P i and I i are the strict and the indifference preference relation induced by R i . We then say that R i is a single-peaked preference with peak i if for all x, y ∈ T such that i ≥ x > y or i ≤ x < y, we have that x P i y. Similarly, R i is a single-dipped preference with dip i if for all x, y ∈ T such that i ≥ x > y or i ≤ x < y, we have that y P i x. 5 The preference domain of agent i is
is the set of all single-peaked (single-dipped)
preferences with peak (dip) i. Observe that the individual preference domains are personalized.
A preference profile is a set of preferences R = (R i ) i∈N . The domain of all admissible preference profiles is denoted by R = × i∈N R i . Let R A be the set of preference profiles such that only the agents in A ⊆ N have single-peaked preferences. Sometimes we will write R
Similarly, R S ∈ R S and R −S ∈ R −S are the restrictions of R to the agents in S ⊆ N and (N \ S), respectively. We will write R −i instead of R −{i} .
The following concepts will be useful in the course of our analysis. A non-ordered pair of alternatives {x, y} is said to be a fixed pair for agent i if for all a, b ∈ {x, y} such that a < b, we cannot have that a < i < b. Observe that given any type of preferences of agent i (single-peaked or singledipped), if {x, y} is a fixed pair for i, then this agent has always the same ordinal preferences over {x, y}. Similarly, the ordered pair of alternatives (x, y) is said to be a fixed pair for agent i at R
Finally, we can see that if {x, y} is a fixed pair for agent i, then (x, y) is a fixed pair for one type of preferences and (y, x) is a fixed pair for the other type.
The solution concept is a social choice rule, a function f : R → T that selects for each preference profile R ∈ R a feasible location f (R) ∈ T . We denote the range of f in the domain R A by R f (A). We say that f is manipulable by group S ⊆ N if each agent belonging to S benefits from 5 Technically speaking, these preferences only have a maximal/minimal alternative at i if i ∈ T . Otherwise, its most/less preferred feasible alternative is the closest one situated at i's left or right.
a simultaneous misrepresentation of preferences; that is, if there is a preference profile R ∈ R and some alternative preferences R S ∈ R S such that f (R S , R −S ) P i f (R) for all i ∈ S. Then, f is strategy-proof if it is not manipulable by any group S ⊆ N with |S| = 1. Similarly, f is group strategy-proof if it is not manipulable by any group S ⊆ N . The social choice rule f is Pareto efficient if for all R ∈ R, there is no x ∈ T such that x R i f (R) for all i ∈ N and x P j f (R) for some j ∈ N . Finally, f is dictatorial if there exists an agent i ∈ N (called the dictator) such that
The remaining part of this section is devoted to three examples of different structures of N and T and their effects on the possibilities of constructing meaningful strategy-proof social choice rules.
They provide some first insights on the results that will be developed in the following sections. In the first example each of the three agents is situated between two of the three feasible locations and no agent is situated at a feasible location.
Example 1 Suppose that N = {3, 4, 5} and T = {1, 2, 6}. Then, each agent i ∈ N has six possible preferences over T under R. If she has single-peaked preferences, her possible preferences
Similarly, if she has single-dipped preferences, her possible preferences are 1P i 2P i 6, 1P i 6P i 2, or 6P i 1P i 2. Thus, R coincides with the universal preference domain and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility results apply.
Fortunately, Example 1 is an extreme case and mostly we are going to be able to construct meaningful rules. We show that for a particular case in which each agent is either situated to the left or to the right of all feasible locations. 2, 8, 9} and T = {3, 4, 5, 6, 7} . Let the social choice rule f be such that for all A ⊆ N and all R ∈ R A , f (R) = 3 + |{{1, 2} ∩ (N \ A)}| + |{{8, 9} ∩ A}|. It can be checked that f is strategy-proof, group strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, non-dictatorial, and has more than two alternatives in its range.
In the last example, the set of feasible locations is infinite and each agent is situated at a feasible location. Then, it is again possible to find rules that satisfy the desired properties.
Example 3 Suppose that N = {1, 2, 3} and T = [0, 4] . Consider the social choice rule f defined through the following procedure: (i) if the set of agents with single-peaked preferences is nonempty, choose the mean location of these agents; and (ii) otherwise, choose by simple majority with any tie-breaker between the extremes 0 and 4. It can be checked that f is strategy-proof, group strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, non-dictatorial, and has more than two alternatives in its range.
Examples 1 to 3 show the importance of the structure of N and T . In Sections 3 and 4, we analyze the general problem without making any assumptions on N and T . Afterwards, in Section 5, we put some structure on N and T in order to obtain particular characterizations.
3 The main structure of the strategy-proof rules
Our first result is a necessary condition on the range of f that facilitates the further analysis. The condition states that if a social choice rule is strategy-proof, its range can include at most two alternatives for a given set of agents A with single-peaked preferences.
Proposition 1 implies that any strategy-proof rule can be divided into two steps. In the first step, agents have to declare only their types of preferences and depending on the set of agents with single-peaked preferences A, one or two locations are preselected. If only one alternative is preselected, this alternative is finally implemented. If two alternatives are preselected, the alternative that is finally implemented has to be determined in the second step of the procedure.
Example 3 illustrates that there are strategy-proof social choice rules that have two alternatives in their range for a given set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Since R f (A) contains at most two preselected locations, we indicate by l f (A) and r f (A) the elements of R f (A) such that
, r f (A)) corresponds to the set of agents that are situated strictly between the preselected alternatives.
Next, we derive several conditions the second step of a strategy-proof social choice rule has to satisfy. To do so, let f A : R A → R f (A) be the binary decision function that chooses between l f (A) and r f (A) if the set of agents that declared to have single-peaked preferences is equal to A.
The next proposition establishes that only the preferences of the agents belonging to S f (A) can affect the outcome of f A . The intuition of this result is the following: since the two preselected locations form an ordered pair for all agents situated to the left of l f (A) or to the right of r f (A), the binary decision function f A must be independent of these preferences in order to guarantee the strategy-proofness of f .
As a corollary of Proposition 2, we can reduce the domain of
, then at least one agent has to be situated between the two preselected alternatives.
Thus, we can partition S f (A) for a given profile R ∈ R A into three groups depending on the ordinal preferences over the two preselected alternatives:
With this notation at hand we can now describe some particular binary decision functions that indicate the sets of agents that are able to impose the left preselected alternative over the right one. These decisive sets depend on R S i f (R) , the preferences of the agents belonging to S f (A) that are indifferent
The definition shows that the decisive sets have to satisfy three intuitive monotonicity properties and a non-emptiness condition. First, all supersets of a decisive set are also decisive. Second, if a set of agents B ∪ {j} cannot impose l f (A) when only the agents of B ∪ {j} prefer l f (A) to r f (A), then the set B is also not able to impose l f (A) when agent j switches her preferences and becomes indifferent between the two preselected alternatives. Third, if a set of agents B can impose l f (A) when only the agents of B prefer l f (A) to r f (A) and agent j prefers r f (A)
to l f (A), then B is also able to impose l f (A) when agent j becomes indifferent between the two preselected alternatives. Finally, the non-emptiness condition guarantees that each of the preselected alternatives is implemented at least once if all agents have strict preferences over
Still, a description of a family of l f (A)-decisive sets is not sufficient to define a binary decision function f A , because it does not provide a solution when all agents of S f (A) are indifferent between l f (A) and r f (A). In this case, we have to apply a tie-breaking rule
there exists a family of l f (A)-decisive sets over R f (A), G(R S i f (R) ), together with a tie-breaking rule
A voting by collections of l f (A)-decisive sets with tie-breakers t A is, although formally complicated to define, a relatively simple binary decision function. First, a collection of l f (A)-decisive sets over R f (A) is defined for each subprofile R S i f (R) of agents belonging to S f (A) that are indifferent between the preselected alternatives. The outcome of f A for a subprofile
, the tie-breaking rule t A is used to determine the alternative that is ultimately chosen.
We note that our family of binary decision functions is almost identical to the family introduced under the same name in Manjunath [8] , where it is shown that these are the unique type of rules that are strategy-proof and unanimous in the domain of single-dipped preferences when the two alternatives to choose from are the extreme locations min T and max T . The only difference is that the non-emptiness requirement of the family of decisive coalitions G(R S i f (R) ) is always needed in Manjunath [8] and not only when S i f (R) = ∅. Our next result shows that the binary decision function f A associated to any strategy-proof social choice rule f has to be a voting by collections of l f (A)-decisive sets with tie-breakers t A .
Proposition 3
If f is strategy-proof, the family of binary decision functions {f A :
} A⊆N is a family of voting by collections of l f (A)-decisive sets with tie-breakers t A .
Propositions 1 and 3 describe the basic structure any strategy-proof social choice rule has to satisfy. The next corollary summarizes it.
Corollary 1 Suppose that f is strategy-proof. Then, there is a decomposition of f into a function
decisive sets with tie-breakers t A such that for all A ⊆ N and all preference profiles R ∈ R A ,
4 A complete characterization of the strategy-proof rules
The structure of R f
In order to obtain a complete characterization, we have to derive additional necessary conditions on top of Corollary 1. We first analyze the function R f used in the first step of the two-step procedure. In particular, we are going to explain how the preselected alternatives could change as more agents declare to have single-peaked preferences.
Proposition 4
Suppose that f is strategy-proof. Then, for all A ⊂ N and all i ∈ N :
•
Proposition 4 establishes that if agent i passes from having single-dipped to single-peaked preferences, the preselected alternatives in R f (A ∪ {i}) have to be closer to i than those in R f (A).
In fact, if agent i is situated strictly between the two preselected alternatives of R f (A), then 
The relation between decisive sets
Next, we study additional necessary conditions that arise in the second step of the rules. In particular, we analyze how the decisive sets change as an agent passes from having single-dipped to single-peaked preferences. We separate the analysis depending on the different cases that can appear due to Proposition 4. So, we assume first that agent i is situated strictly between the two preselected alternatives when she declares to have single-dipped preferences and the preselected alternatives change when agent i announces to have single-peaked preferences in such a way that agent i is also situated strictly between l f (A∪{i}) and r f (A∪{i}). The proposition then establishes that agent i is a dictator in the second step of the social choice rule; that is, agent i belongs to all decisive coalitions that can impose l f (A) or l f (A ∪ {i}) in any profile of R A or R A∪{i} in which she is not indifferent.
Proposition 5
Suppose that f is strategy-proof. Then, for all A ⊂ N and all agents i ∈ A such
, and all preference profiles R ∈ R A∪{i} and
The next proposition focuses on the situations in which
i is situated to the left (right) of both preselected locations of R f (A), it has to be easier (more difficult) to select the left point of R f (A) when agent i changes her type of preferences from single-dipped to single-peaked. Here, easier (more difficult) means that the set of coalitions that can impose the left point of R f (A) when agent i declares to have single-peaked preferences has to be a superset (subset) of the set when she declares to have single-dipped preferences. Also, if
and agent i is situated between the two preselected alternatives, the set of coalitions that can impose the left point of the range has to be invariant to the type of preferences of agent i.
Proposition 6
Suppose that f is strategy-proof. Then, for all A ⊂ N and all agents i ∈ A such that R f (A) = R f (A ∪ {i}) and all preference profiles R ∈ R A and R = (
) whenever i ≤ r f (A), and G(
Next, we analyze what happens if agent i is situated to the left or to the right of the alternatives in R f (A) and at least one of these locations changes when agent i changes her type of preferences from single-dipped to single-peaked in such a way that S f (A) ∩ S f (A ∪ {i}) is non-empty. We then find that if agent i is situated to the right (left) of R f (A) and a coalition B is decisive when agent i declares to have single-peaked (single-dipped) preferences, then the intersection between B and all agents with single-dipped preferences that are situated between the two preselected alternatives is a decisive set once agent i changes preferences.
Proposition 7
Suppose that f is strategy-proof. Then, for all A ⊂ N , all agents i ∈ A, and all preference profiles R ∈ R A∪{i} and R = (
).
The last proposition studies what happens if i is situated strictly between the two preselected alternatives of R f (A) and i belongs to R f (A ∪ {i}). Then, by Proposition 4, the location of agent i is the unique preselected location or it is accompanied by l f (A) or r f (A). In the first case, there is no room for additional conditions in the second step of the rule. In the latter case, the result states that if a coalition is able to impose the point different from i when she has single-peaked preferences, the single-peaked agents of this coalition can impose the very same point if agent i has single-dipped preferences.
, and all preference profiles R ∈ R A∪{i} and R = (
The characterization result
So far, we have established a set of necessary conditions for a social choice rule f to be strategyproof. Our main theorem shows that the union of these necessary conditions is also sufficient.
This theorem also shows that the characterized rules are group strategy-proof. So, this stronger property is obtained for free. 1. The social choice rule f : R → T is strategy-proof.
2. The social choice rule f : R → T is group strategy-proof.
3. There is a function R f : 2 N → T 2 satisfying Proposition 4 and a family {f A : R S f (A) → R f (A)} A⊆N of voting by collections of l f (A)-decisive sets with tie-breakers t A satisfying Propositions 5, 6, 7 and 8 such that for all A ⊆ N and all preference profiles R ∈ R A ,
Discussion and additional characterizations
The structure of the characterized family and in particular the conditions imposed by Propositions 4 to 8 depend on the relation between N and T . In particular, there are situations, such as Example 1, in which all strategy-proof rules with at least three alternatives in the range are dictatorial, leading again to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility. Fortunately, Examples 2 and 3 indicate that this is generally not the case. To characterize all situations in which we can escape from this impossibility, we need to introduce some notation: a triple {x, y, z} ⊆ T is said to be full at N if N ∩ {x, y, z} = ∅ and N ⊂ (min{x, y, z}, max{x, y, z}).
Theorem 2 There are non-dictatorial and strategy-proof social choice rules on R with at least three alternatives in the range if and only if there is a triple of T that is not full at N .
The condition in Theorem 2 can be explained more intuitively depending on the size of T .
opposite preferences but does not satisfy sequential inclusion (the proof can be provided upon request), their results imply that there exists a subdomain of R where strategy-proofness does not imply group strategy-proofness.
Corollary 2
The following statements hold:
• If |T | ≥ 5, there are non-dictatorial and strategy-proof social choice rules on R with at least three alternatives in the range.
• If |T | = 4, there are non-dictatorial and strategy-proof social choice rules on R with at least three alternatives in the range if and only if T cannot be partitioned into T 1 and T 2 such that |T 1 | = |T 2 | = 2, max T 1 < min N , and max N < min T 2 .
• If |T | = 3, there are non-dictatorial and strategy-proof social choice rules on R with at least three alternatives in the range if and only if N ∩ T = ∅ and/or N ⊂ (min T, max T ).
One can see that if there are more than 4 alternatives, then it is always possible to find strategyproof (and, by Theorem 1, group strategy-proof) social choice rules that have at least three alternatives in their range. Otherwise, it is sufficient to have an agent that is situated at a feasible location or at the left (or right) of at least three alternatives. 7 However, even if the condition in Theorem 2 is met and there is a triple that is not full at N , it is not guaranteed that we can construct meaningful rules since it is possible that for some N and T the addition of Pareto efficiency to the condition of strategy-proofness leads to the dictatorial rules. Examples 2 and 3 indicate again that this is generally not the case. Our next proposition presents a first necessary condition on T for the existence of Pareto efficient rules.
Proposition 9 Let T be a set of alternatives so that it is possible to find Pareto efficient rules on R. Then, min T and max T exist.
Proposition 9 shows that independently of the locations of the agents, it is necessary that T has a minimum and a maximum. So, we assume this from now on. Our next result characterizes the additional conditions the relation between N and T has to satisfy in order to be able to combine 7 If |T | = 3 and none of these conditions is satisfied, R coincides with the universal domain (see Example 1).
Thus, R restricts the universal domain but does not allow us to escape from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility only if |T | = 4 and the relation between N and T is the one described in the second point of Corollary 2.
Pareto efficiency and strategy-proofness without arriving at the dictatorial rules. To do so, let l j = max{x ∈ T : x ≤ j} and r j = min{x ∈ T : x ≥ j}.
Theorem 3 There are Pareto efficient and strategy-proof social choice rules on R different from the dictatorial ones if and only if there are two agents i, j ∈ N such that each k ∈ {i, j} satisfies one of the following conditions: (a) k ∈ (min T, max T ), (b) k ∈ T or (c) l k and r k exist; with at least one of them satisfying (a) or (b).
According to Theorem 3 it is required that there is one agent situated at a feasible location or to the left (or right) of all feasible locations; and another agent that satisfies any of these characteristics or is situated at a location that has defined nearest feasible points to both its left and its right.
Since a general characterization of all Pareto efficient and strategy-proof rules for all sets N and T that satisfy the properties of Theorem 3 is quite difficult to define in an intuitive way, we consider now two focal cases that reflect the two conditions that are sufficient to guarantee possibility results.
Agents situated outside the closure of feasible locations
The first condition that guarantees on its own the possibility of combining Pareto efficiency and strategy-proofness without arriving at dictatorial rules is that at least two agents are situated outside the closure of feasible locations. We are going to provide the characterization for the focal case when N ∩ [min T, max T ] = ∅. Observe that this framework covers Example 2. Let N l = {i ∈ N : i < min T } and N r = {i ∈ N : i > max T } be the sets of agents situated to the left and to the right of all feasible locations, respectively. Obviously,
Since no agent is situated between alternatives of T , only one alternative gets preselected in the first step of the two-step functions characterized in Theorem 1. Therefore, the range of R f becomes T instead of T 2 . This implies that the characterized rules are types-only; i.e., they only depend on the type of preferences (single-peaked or single-dipped) of each agent, but not on its particular structure. To introduce the characterization result, we need the following definition: a function
A social choice rule f : R → T is strategyproof and Pareto efficient if and only if there is a monotone function R f : 2 N → T , where
Observe that the rule included in Example 2 belongs to the characterized family.
Agents situated at feasible locations
The second condition that guarantees on its own the possibility of combining Pareto efficiency and strategy-proofness without arriving at dictatorial rules is that there are at least two agents at feasible locations. We are thus interested in the focal case when N ⊆ T . Since agents situated at the extreme locations have exactly the same set of admissible preferences over T as agents at the left or right of all feasible alternatives, we assume for the sake of simplicity that N ⊂ (min T, max T ).
This setting includes many of the natural frameworks studied in the literature; for example, when, like in Example 3, T is a closed interval and all agents are situated within T . Since the description of the Pareto efficient and strategy-proof rules is still quite complex, we impose tops-onliness as an additional condition. Formally, a social choice rule f is tops-only if for all i ∈ N , all A ⊆ N and all preference profiles R, R ∈ R A such that {x ∈ T : x R i y for all y ∈ T } = {x ∈ T :
x R i y for all y ∈ T }, then f (R) = f (R ). Given that N ⊂ T , it is easy to see that for all i ∈ N and all R i ∈ R i , the top alternatives t(R i ) satisfy that t(R i ) ⊂ {i, min T, max T }. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the top of each agent is unique.
Before providing a formal definition of the rules, we are going to describe them intuitively. First, any rule f of the characterized family selects a non-empty set of decisive agents D f ⊆ N and a set of coalitions of decisive agents G f ⊂ 2 D f satisfying the properties of Definition 1. Then, if all decisive agents have single-dipped preferences, the outcome is one of the extreme points, and it depends on whether the set of decisive agents with top min T belongs to G f (in which case, min T is selected) or not (in which case, max T is selected). If, however, at least one decisive agent has single-peaked preferences, an interior point situated between the locations of the decisive agents with single-peaked preferences is chosen by a monotone aggregator f 1 of the peaks of the agents with single-peaked preferences. The formal definition is as follows.
Definition 3
The social choice rule f is said to be a conditional two-step rule if there is a non-
, and a non-empty set of decisive sets G f ⊂ 2 D f satisfying the properties of Definition 1 such that for all A ⊆ N and all preference profiles R ∈ R A ,
The following result states the characterization.
Theorem 5 Suppose that N ⊂ T and N ⊂ (min T, max T ). A social choice rule f is strategyproof, Pareto efficient and tops-only if and only if it is a conditional two-step rule.
We can see that any conditional two-step rule depends on three characteristics: the set of decisive agents D f , the coalitions of them that are decisive G f , and the aggregator f 1 used to choose an interior point. For instance, the rule proposed in Example 3 is obtained if D f is the set of all agents, if G f is the set of all coalitions that contain at least two agents, and if f 1 is the mean.
Another example are dictatorships that are obviously included in the family. A dictatorship of agent i is associated with D f = {i} (observe that it is then not necessary to specify G f and f 1 ). there is a preference profile R = (R i , R −i ) ∈ R A such that f (R) = x. Our first lemma shows that if x and y belong to the option set of agent i, then i is situated between x and y.
Lemma 1 Suppose that f is strategy-proof. Then, for all A ⊆ N , all agents i ∈ N , all profiles R ∈ R, and all alternatives x, y ∈ T such that x < y, if x, y ∈ O i (A, R −i ), then x < i < y.
whenever i ∈ A and at R via R i whenever i ∈ A. Similarly, if y ≤ i, then agent i can manipulate f at R via R i whenever i ∈ A and at (R i , R −i ) via R i whenever i ∈ A. Hence, x < i < y.
Lemma 1 directly implies that the option set of any agent contains at most two alternatives.
Corollary 3 Suppose that f is strategy-proof. Then, for all A ⊆ N , all agents i ∈ N , and all
The next lemma shows that f always selects a maximal alternative of an agent's option set.
Lemma 2 Suppose that f is strategy-proof. Then, for all A ⊆ N , all agents i ∈ N , and all profiles
Proof: Suppose otherwise; that is, there is a preference profile R such that f (R) = x and y P i x.
Then, agent i manipulates f at R via R i . Hence, x R i y.
The next lemma is crucial for the proof of the proposition. It shows that if the proposition was wrong (i.e. f is strategy-proof and |R f (A)| > 2 for some A ⊆ N ), then there would be a profile R and two preferences R i ∈ R A i and R j ∈ R A j so that the outcomes at R, (R i , R −i ), and (R j , R −j ) differ.
Lemma 3 Suppose that f is strategy-proof. Then, for all A ⊆ N such that |R f (A)| > 2, there are two agents i, j ∈ N and three profiles R,
Proof: Consider any A ⊆ N and suppose that |R f (A)| > 2. Then, there are three preference outcome at either of the two profiles has to change at some point of the process. Let C and (C i , C −i ) be the profiles where the outcomes are still x and y, respectively, and let (C S , C −S ) and (C S∪{i} , C −(S∪{i}) ) be the first time in which one (or both) profiles have an outcome z ∈ {x, y}.
Assume without loss of generality that f (C S , C −S ) = z. Let S = {j 1 , . . . , j s } and observe that s+1 agents have changed their preferences in the sequence to produce the three different outcomes:
first, agent i changes preferences from C i to C i ; then, s agents change preferences (from the ones in C S to the ones in C S ) to arrive at z. We complete the proof by induction on s.
• If s = 1, denote profile C by R, preference C i by R i , agent j 1 by j, and preference C j1 by R j . Then, we have established the result.
• Suppose that the statement of the proposition is correct for all s < k.
• We now prove the statement of the proposition for s = k. Consider any V ⊂ S ∪ {i} with V ∈ {S, {i}}. If f (C V , C −V ) ∈ {x, y}, consider the sequence that starts with (C i , C −i ), passes through C, and ends at (C V , C −V ) whenever i ∈ V , and the sequence that starts with C, passes through (C i , C −i ), and ends at (C V , C −V ) whenever i ∈ V . We can see that the number of agents that have changed their preferences to produce three different results in these sequences is smaller than k + 1. So, the result follows from the induction hypothesis.
Suppose now that f (C V , C −V ) = y for some V ⊂ S. Then, consider the sequence that starts at C, passes through (C V , C −V ), and ends at (C S , C −S ). In this sequence, the number of agents that have changed their preferences to produce the three different outcomes is s = k < k + 1. The result follows then again from the induction hypothesis. Then, we deduce that f (C V , C −V ) = x for all V ⊂ S. Suppose now that f (C V , C −V ) = y for some V ⊂ S ∪ {i} with i ∈ V = {i}. Then, consider the sequence that starts at (C V , C −V ), passes through (C V \{i} , C −(V \{i}) ) and ends at (C S , C −S ). In this sequence, the number of agents that have changed their preferences to produce three different outcomes is again less than k + 1 and, thus, the result follows from the induction hypothesis. Consequently, we assume from now on that f (C V , C −V ) = x for all V ⊂ S ∪ {i} with V ∈ {S, {i}}.
Next, we concentrate on f (C S∪{i} , C −(S∪{i}) ). If f (C S∪{i} , C −(S∪{i}) ) ∈ {x, z}, consider the sequence that starts at (C S∪{i}\{j} , C −(S∪{i}\{j}) ), where agent j belongs to S, passes through (C S∪{i} , C −(S∪{i}) ), and ends at (C S , C −S ). Then, denote (C S∪{i} , C −(S∪{i}) ) by R, C i by R i , and C j by R j to establish the result. If, however, f (C S∪{i} , C −(S∪{i}) ) = z, take the sequence that starts at (C i , C −i ) and then changes the preferences of all agents j ∈ S one-by-one in order to end up at (C S∪{i} , C −(S∪{i}) ). In this sequence, the number of agents that have changed their preferences to produce the three different outcomes is s = k < k + 1. Then, the induction hypothesis applies again. Thus, we conclude that
Since f (C V , C −V ) = x for all V ⊂ S ∪ {i} with V ∈ {S, {i}} and f (C i , C −i ) = y, we have that O j (A, (C i , C −{i,j} )) = {x, y} for all j ∈ S. It also follows from f (C V , C −V ) = x for all V ⊂ S ∪ {i} with V ∈ {S, {i}} and f (C S , C −S ) = z that O j (A, (C S\{j} , C −S )) = {x, z} for all j ∈ S. Similarly, we obtain that O i (A, C −i ) = {x, y} and O i (A, (C S , C −S )) = {x, z}. So, it follows from Lemma 1 that {y, z} is a fixed pair of alternatives for all agents of S ∪ {i}. Consider now any agent m ∈ S and any preference R m ∈ R A m such that y P m x and z P m x, which exists given the previous findings. It follows then from Lemma 2 together with O m (A, (C i , C −{i,m} )) = {x, y} and O m (A, (C S\{m} , C −S )) = {x, z} that f (R m , C i , C −{i,m} ) = y and f (R m , C S\{m} , C −S ) = z, respectively.
Finally, take the sequence of profiles that starts with (R m , C i , C −{i,m} ), and change the preferences of all agents l ∈ S ∪ {i} \ {m} so that the sequence ends at (R m , C S\{m} , C −S ).
If only y and z are chosen along this sequence, then the agent at whom the outcome changes can manipulate f given that {y, z} is a fixed pair for all agents belonging to S ∪ {i}. So, there have to be at least three different outcomes along this sequence. However, observe that the number of agents that have changed their preferences to produce the three different outcomes is s = k < k + 1. So, the result follows from the induction hypothesis.
This concludes the proof. Now, we are ready to prove Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1: Suppose that |R f (A)| > 2. Then, by Lemma 3, there are three profiles
f (R i , R j , R −{i,j} ) = w and observe that although x, y and z are different, it could be that w ∈ {x, y, z}. Also, assume without loss of generality that x < y. Next, we study the implications of the different option sets.
(1) Since O i (A, R −i ) = {x, y} and x < y by assumption, Lemma 1 implies that x < i < y.
(2) Observe that {z, w} ⊆ O i (A, (R j , R −{i,j} )). So, if w = z, then w < i < z or z < i < w by Lemma 1.
(3) Since O j (A, R −j ) = {x, z}, Lemma 1 implies that x < j < z or z < j < x.
(4) Observe that {w, y} ⊆ O j (A, (R i , R −{i,j} )). So, if w = y, then w < j < y or y < j < w by Lemma 1.
We show that f is not strategy-proof by constructing manipulations depending on how w relates to the other alternatives.
Case 1: Suppose that w = y. Then, y < i < z or z < i < y by (2) and x < j < z or z < j < x by (3). Observe that if y < i < z, the fact that x < i < y by (1) implies that i < y < i, which is impossible. So, we must have that z < i < y. This, together with x < i < y by (1), implies that {x, z} is a fixed pair for agent i. Since x < i, z < i, and j is between x and z by (3), we also have that either {x, y} or {y, z} is a fixed pair for agent j. Suppose that {x, y} is a fixed pair for j (the other case is similar and thus omitted). We can then conclude that z < j < x < i < y. The remainder of this case is divided into two parts.
• If i ∈ A, consider any preference
)) = {x, y} and, by Lemma 1, j lies between x and y. This is a contradiction because we have already seen before that j < x < y.
• If i ∈ A, consider any preference R i ∈ R − i such that z P i y P i x. Since O i (A, R −i ) = {x, y} and O i (A, (R j , R −{i,j} )) = {y, z}, it follows from Lemma 2 that f (R i , R −i ) = y and f (R i , R j , R −{i,j} ) = z. Thus, O j (A, (R i , R −{i,j} )) = {y, z}. Now, we separate the proof depending whether j belongs to A or not.
If j ∈ A, consider any preference
Lemma 2 also implies that f (R i , R j , R −{i,j} ) = y. Individual i will then manipulate f at this profile via R i to obtain z. If j ∈ A, consider any preference R j ∈ R + j such that
Case 2: Suppose that w = z. The proof is similar to the one above and is thus omitted.
Case 3: Suppose that w ∈ {y, z}. By (2), we have that z < i < w or w < i < z. Let z < i < w.
Then, since j lies between x and z by (3) and both x and z are smaller than i by (1), we conclude that j < i. Also observe that j lies between y and w by (4) and that both y and w are greater than i by (1). Consequently, j > i, which cannot be. Hence, we must have w < i < z. Next,
by (4), we have that y < j < w or w < j < y. Let y < j < w. Then, (1) and (4) imply that x < i < y < j < w. So, i < w, which contradicts that w < i. Hence, we must have that w < j < y.
Similarly we have by (3) that z < j < x or x < j < z. Let z < j < x. Then, w < i < z < j < x
by (2) and (3), which contradicts that x < i by (1) . So, we must have that x < j < z.
At this point, we can see that that the four conditions x < i < y, w < i < z, w < j < y, and x < j < z are indeed compatible for the moment. In fact, it turns out that x and w are both smaller than each i and j, which are in turn both smaller than each y and z. This also implies that both {w, x} and {y, z} are fixed pairs for both agents i and j. Finally, consider any preferencê
via R i when her fixed pair at R A i is (y, z) and at (R i ,R j , R −{i,j} ) via R i when her fixed pair at R A i is (z, y).
Proof of Proposition 2
We first establish the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Suppose that f is strategy-proof. Then, for any two profiles R,
Proof: Starting at R, construct the sequence of profiles in which we change the preferences of all agents j ∈ S one-by-one from R j to R j . Since f (R) = f (R S , R −S ) by assumption, there is subset
Now, we are ready to prove the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose that there are two profiles R, R ∈ R A such that
and f (R) = f (R ). By Lemma 4, there is a set D ⊂ N \ S f (A) and
R f (A) by Corollary 3. Since i ∈ S f (A) by construction, this contradicts Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider any A ⊆ N and define for each subprofile
-decisive coalitions in the following way: the set B belongs to G(
there is a profile R ∈ R A such that
We show first that a voting by these collections of l f (A)-decisive sets with any tie-breakers t A is a well-defined binary decision function. That is, if
Suppose by contradiction that this is not the case and f (R) = r f (A). By definition, there is a profile R ∈ R A such that
and f (R ) = l f (A). Then, by Lemma 4, there is a set D ⊂ S f (A) and an agent
and f (R) = r f (A). Then, agent j manipulates f at this profile via any R j ∈ R A j such that r f (A)P j l f (A) to obtain l f (A).
Next, we show that if
and applying Lemma 4, there is a set D ⊂ S f (A) and an agent i
It is possible to show in a similar way that if
), where
Suppose to the contrary that
) so that f (R ) = r f (A). Then, by Lemma 4, there is a set D ⊂ S f (A) and an agent
contradicts the fact that they are different.
), where R ∈ R A is such that
a similar reasoning.
Proof of Proposition 4
Since the first two statements are dual, we only consider the case r f (A) ≤ i. First, to see
by Proposition 3. If, on the other hand, r f (A) = i, consider a profile R ∈ R A∪{i} such that
f (R) = r f (A ∪ {i}) by Proposition 3, and agent i manipulates f at this profile via any R i ∈ R − i .
Next, we show that r f (A ∪ {i}) ≥ r f (A). Suppose that r f (A ∪ {i}) < r f (A) and consider the profile R ∈ R A∪{i} such that r f (A) P j l f (A) for all j ∈ S f (A) and r f (A ∪ {i})
Observe that a similar argument can be used to show that l f (A ∪ {i}) ≥ l f (A).
Finally, we consider the cases when i ∈ (l f (A), r f (A)). In order to see that i ≤ r f (A ∪ {i}), assume by contradiction that i > r f (A ∪ {i}) and take a profile R ∈ R A∪{i} such that r f (A)
Thus, agent i manipulates it via any
Then, by Proposition 3, we have that f (R) = r f (A ∪ {i}). However, agent i manipulates it via anyR i ∈ R − i such that l f (A)P i r f (A) to obtain l f (A) by Proposition 3. Finally, one can show in a similar way that if r f (A ∪ {i}) = i, then l f (A ∪ {i}) ∈ {l f (A), i}.
Proof of Proposition 5
Consider first the case when
if and only if i ∈ B for all R ∈ R A such that i ∈ S i f (R ). Suppose otherwise; that is, there is some profileR ∈ R A such that f (R) = x and yP i x, where x, y ∈ R f (A). Assume without loss of generality that x = r f (A). Then, consider a profileR ∈ R A with r f (A)P j l f (A) for all
Since f (R) = r f (A), it follows from Proposition 3 that f (R) = r f (A). However, agent i then manipulates f atR via any
by contradiction, that there is some R ∈ R A such that f (R ) = x and y P i x, where x, y ∈ R f (A).
Let x = r f (A) -the case when x = l f (A) is similar and thus omitted-and consider a preference
by assumption, we also have that for allR i ∈ R + i with
Observe finally that the proof of the other implication is similar and thus omitted. Consequently, the two implications are equivalent.
Consider now any profileR ∈ R
If there is a preference
, then strategy-proofness implies that
If this occurs with all profiles of R A , we would obtain that i is a dictator in all profiles of R A and, by the equivalence obtained in the previous paragraph, i is also a dictator in all profiles of R A∪{i} and the proof is complete. So, suppose from now on that
Suppose now that the proposition is wrong. Then, there is some coalition
We are going to show next that D ⊆ S f (A) ∩ A. To do this, suppose otherwise and consider the profileR ∈ R A such thatR A) ), and both r f (A)P l l f (A) and
. However, agent i will then manipulate f atR via R i . Consequently, D only contains agents from S f (A) with single-peaked preferences atR ∈ R A . It can be shown in a very similar way that 
Proof of Proposition 6
We will only show that for all preference profiles R ∈ R A and all R = (
) whenever i ≤ r f (A); the other implication can be proved similarly.
Suppose there is a set C of agents that is a decisive set when i has single-dipped preferences but not when i has single-peaked preferences; that is,
, and for all agents
Thus, agent i manipulates f at R via R i . If, on the other hand, i ∈ C, consider a profilē
and for all k
only if k ∈ C. Then, f (R) = r f (A), but agent i can manipulate f at this profile via anyR i ∈ R − i such that l f (A)P i r f (A) to obtain l f (A).
Proof of Proposition 7
We will only consider the case when i ≥ r f (A) > l f (A ∪ {i}), the other situation is similar. So suppose that B ∈ G(R S i f (R) ) for some R ∈ R A∪{i} and assume by contradiction that there is
Proof of Proposition 8
We will only consider the case when l f (A) = l f (A ∪ {i}) because the other is similar. By contradition, suppose that there is some B ∈ G(
Proof of Theorem 1
This implication has been shown throughout the paper.
[3] ⇒ [2] : Take any of these social choice rules f . Assume, by contradiction, that there is a profile R ∈ R, a group of agents S ⊆ N and a subprofile R S of a profile R ∈ R such that f (R S , R −S ) P i f (R) for all i ∈ S. We can assume without loss of generality that f (R S , R −S ) > f (R). Then, all agents i ≤ f (R) of S must have single-dipped preferences at R and all agents i ≥ f (R S , R −S ) of S must have single-peaked preferences at R for the manipulation to be effective.
Let A ⊆ N be the set of agents with single-peaked preferences at R and let C ⊆ N be the set of agents with single-peaked preferences at (R S , R −S ). Denote by B be the set of agents with single- 
If l f (B) < l f (C) and/or r f (B) < r f (C), then there is at least one agent i ∈ (S \ S f (A)) that moves one or both preselected locations to the right when changing her preferences from R i to R i .
Suppose first that the agents in (S \S f (A)) that move one or both preselected locations to the right are only located in (S f (B)\S f (A)). Let i be one of these agents. The fact that (S f (B)\S f (A)) = ∅ implies that there is at least one agent
When the rest of the single-peaked agents (that is, the agents of S f (A) ∩ S ∩ A) change their preferences, Proposition 5 implies that R f (A \ {j}) = R f (E), where E is the set of agents with single-peaked preferences in that moment. By Proposition 6, j is a dictator in R f (E).
We would like to show that
Suppose by contradiction that this is not the case. Assume without loss of generality that k > j. Given that k cannot be a dictator in R f (E), Propositions 4 (third case) and 5 implies that R f (E ∪ {k}) ∈ {{k}, {k, l f (E)}, {k, r f (E)}}. It is not possible that R f (E ∪ {k}) = {k} because if we continue changing the preferences of the rest of agents of (S f (A) ∩ (S \ A)),
we would have by Proposition 8 that the empty coalition would belong to G(R S i f (R) ) for any R ∈ R E∪{k} such that j is not indifferent between l f (E) and r f (E), violating Proposition 3. Therefore, R f (E ∪ {k}) = R f (E) and, by Proposition 6,  we also have that j is a dictator in R f (E ∪ {k}). Repeating the same arguments we arrive at
Given that j ∈ A and that she was a dictator in R f (A), we necessarily need that f (R S , R −S ) ∈ (l f (A), r f (A)) for the manipulation to be effective. Since f (R) < f (R S , R −S ), it follows that
, by Proposition 4 (third case) we have that R i ∈ R Consequently, we assume from now on that l f (B) ≥ l f (C) and r f (B) ≥ r f (C). Suppose first
Given that i has single-dipped preferences at R, we have reached a contradiction.
Then, we assume from now on that f (R S , R −S ) = r f (C). Suppose additionally that f (R) = r f (A).
Proposition 4, there exists an agent i ∈ S f (A) ∩ S that changes her preferences from R i ∈ R + i to
Given that i ≤ f (R) and she has single-peaked preferences at R, we have a contradiction.
So, we assume from now on that f (R) = l f (A). We divide the analysis into three cases.
1) Suppose that r f (B) < r f (A) and/or l f (B) > l f (A). We will only prove the case when r f (B) < r f (A) because the other is similar and thus omitted. Since r f (C) ≤ r f (B), we have 
, contradicting the fact that S can manipulate f . Suppose finally that i = r f (B). Then, i ≥ f (R S , R −S ) and has single-dipped preferences at R, which is not possible.
2) Suppose that r f (B) > r f (A) and/or l f (A) > l f (B). We will only prove the case when r f (B) > r f (A) because the other is similar and thus omitted. By Proposition 4, there exists an agent j ∈ S f (A)∩S that changes her preferences from R j ∈ R
It follows from similar arguments as employed previously in the proof that j is also a dictator in R f (B). If r f (C) ≥ r f (A), we have that f (R) R j f (R S , R −S ). So, this cannot be.
If r f (C) < r f (A), we have that r f (C) < r f (A) < r f (B) and l f (B) ≤ l f (A). This is only
i (the other case is similar and thus omitted) and, by simplicity, that there is no agent satisfying the other case.
Then, if R f (B ∪ {i}) = R f (B), j is a dictator in R f (B ∪ {i}) by Proposition 6. If, however, R f (B ∪ {i}) = R f (B), we have that r f (B ∪ {i}) > l f (B) because, otherwise, it is not possible that r f (C) > l f (B). Then, by Proposition 7 we obtain that j is a dictator in R f (B ∪ {i}) or that the emptyset is a decisive coalition, which is not possible by Proposition 3. Repeating this process with the remaining agents, the unique option is that j is also a dictator in R f (C). Thus, j < r f (C). By the same argument, j is also a dictator when only i misses to change preferences; that is, j is a dictator for R f (C \ {i}).
Consider now the profile (R S\{j} , R −(S\{j}) ) ∈ R C∪{j} ; that is, all agents i ∈ S apart from j have changed their preferences from R i to R i . By Proposition 4 (third case), r f (C ∪ {j}) ∈ [j, r f (C)].
If r f (C ∪ {j}) ∈ (j, r f (C)) or if [r f (C ∪ {j}) = r f (C) and l f (C ∪ {j}) < j], then j is still a dictator in R f (C ∪ {j}) and i ≤ l f (C) ≤ l f (C ∪ {j}). Suppose now that l f (C ∪ {j} \ {i}) ≤ j. If individual i changes her preferences at (R S\{i∪j} , R −(S\{i∪j}) ) from R i ∈ R − i to R i ∈ R + i , then, by Proposition 7, the decisive coalitions at R f (C ∪ {j}) consist of agents with single-dipped preferences. This contradicts that j is a dictator with single-peaked preferences at R f (C ∪ {j}). On the other hand, if l f (C ∪ {j} \ {i}) > j, then l f (C \ {i}) > j by Proposition 4 (second case). This contradicts that j is a dictator at R f (C \ {i}). If [r f (C ∪ {j}) = r f (C) and l f (C ∪ {j}) = j] or [r f (C ∪ {j}) = j and l f (C ∪{j}) < j], then Proposition 8 implies that the emptyset is a decisive coalition, which violates Proposition 3. Finally, if r f (C ∪{j}) = l f (C ∪{j}) = j, then j ≤ l f (C ∪{j}\{i}) ≤ r f (C ∪{j}\{i})
by Proposition 4. Then, also by Proposition 4, j ≤ l f (C \ {i}) which contradicts the fact that j is a dictator for R f (C \ {i}).
3) Suppose that r f (B) = r f (A) and l f (B) = l f (A). If R f (C) = R f (A), by the iterated application of Proposition 6, the set of decisive sets of agents for R f (C) is equal to the set of decisive sets of agents for R f (A). It follows then from f (R) = l f (A) and f (R S , R −S ) = r f (C) that there is some 
Proof of Proposition 9
We will prove that if min T or max T does not exist, then there are no Pareto efficient rules. To do that we need the following notation: N l = {i ∈ N | i ≤ inf T }, N r = {i ∈ N | i ≥ sup T }, and
Suppose that min T does not exist (the proof when max T does not exist is similar). Consider a profile R ∈ R N l such that for all i ∈ N c and all y > i, there exists x ≤ i with xP i y. Then, there is no Pareto efficient alternative in this profile and, therefore, it is not possible to construct a Pareto efficient social choice rule.
Proof of Theorem 3
⇐]: Suppose that i ∈ N ∩ T and that l j and r j exist (this allows j to satisfy (a) or (c)). Consider any social choice rule f such that R f (A) = {i} if i ∈ A, R f (A) = {l j , r j } if A ∩ {i, j} = {j}, and R f (A) = {min T, max T } otherwise, and where j is a dictator in all R f (A) such that |R f (A)| = 2.
This rule is strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. Suppose next that i ∈ (min T, max T ) and that l j and r j exist (this allows j to satisfy (a) or (c)). Assume without loss of generality that i < min T .
Consider any social choice rule f such that R f (A) = {min T } if i ∈ A, R f (A) = {l j , r j } if A ∩ {i, j} = {j}, and R f (A) = {min T, max T }, and where j is a dictator in all R f (A) such that |R f (A)| = 2. This rule is strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. Suppose finally that i, j ∈ (min T, max T ). Consider any social choice rule f such that R f (A) = {min T } if k < min T for all k ∈ (A ∩ {i, j}), and R f (A) = {max T } otherwise. Any of these rules is strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient.
⇒]: Suppose that N ∩ T = ∅ and N ⊂ (min T, max T ). Then, using similar arguments as in the proof of Proposition 9, we have that R f (∅) = {min T, max T }. By similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 2, we also have that R f ({i}) = R f (∅) for at most one agent i ∈ N .
If R f ({i}) = R f (∅) for all i ∈ N , it follows from the same arguments as those in the proof of Theorem 2 that R f (A) = R f (∅) for all A ⊆ N . Consider a profile R ∈ R N such that there is some x ∈ (T \ {min T, max T }) with x P i min T P i max T for all i ∈ N , which exists given the assumptions. Then, f (R) = min T , but this location is Pareto dominated by x. If, on the other hand, R f ({j}) = R f (∅) for only one agent j ∈ N , it follows from the same arguments as those in the proof of Theorem 2 that R f (A) = R f ({j}) whenever j ∈ A, and that R f (A) = {min T, max T } otherwise. By Propositions 5 and 6, j is a dictator at R f (A) for all A ⊆ N . Since l f (∅) ≤ l f ({j}) ≤ j ≤ r f ({j}) ≤ r f (∅), this rule is dictatorial, being j the dictator.
Proof of Theorem 4
⇐]: The assumption N ∩ [min T, max T ] = ∅ implies that the range of R f is T instead of T 2 .
Hence, Propositions 5 to 8 are satisfied. Similarly, the condition that R f is monotone guarantees that Proposition 4 holds. Then, strategy-proofness is guaranteed by Theorem 1. To show that these rules are Pareto efficient, take any profile R ∈ R A for some A ⊆ N . If A = N l (respectively, A = N r ), all agents prefer min T (respectively, max T ) to any other alternative, and precisely this unanimously best alternative is chosen. In all other cases, observe that for all x, y ∈ T , there are two agents i, j ∈ N such that xP i y and y P j x. This guarantees that any choice is Pareto efficient in these cases.
⇒]: Consider now any strategy-proof and Pareto efficient social choice rule. Then, the rule belongs to the one characterized in Theorem 1. Since the range of R f is T by the structure of N and T , we can concentrate directly on this function. This function is obviously monotone given that
